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Introduction 
 
Participation seems to be the quintessential principle of democracy. Yet, it remains often 
poorly defined when reflecting on democratic architectures. The traditional focus on 
representative democracy has for a long time confined participation to the realm of elections. 
Many institutional architectures discussed in relation to the European Union (EU) copy that 
pattern, such as federalism or intergovernmentalism. However, over the last two decades, 
participation has become a key concept of EU institutional design, far beyond the electoral 
process, and discussed by both institutional actors and academics. The debate on participation 
has the advantage of opening up the scope of analysis and of normative argumentation about 
the multiple actors involved in EU policy-making, including not only the political 
representatives and citizens by way of the electoral process, but also interest representatives 
and experts, as well as citizens directly interacting in governance. At the same time, this 
debate has blurred the normative argumentation on the democratic added value of 
participation. This is particularly the case in the official discourses of the EU Institutions. 
Yet, the academic debate too has failed to provide an institutional architecture or normative 
democratic model for EU governance that puts participation convincingly centre stage. 
Directly deliberative polyarchy (DDP) has been suggested to play this role but, as I will show 
later in this paper, has strong shortcomings as a model for EU democratic governance.  
Hence, rather than putting an institutional architecture or normative model upfront, 
this chapter takes as a starting point the different ways in which participation has been 
debated in relation to European governance. It identifies three main debates on participation 
in EU governance, which are analysed respectively in the three sections of this chapter. The 
first places participation in opposition to representation, the second is based on the dichotomy 
between participation and expertise, while the third focuses on the importance of 
participation in reflexive governance.  
Each of these three debates has emerged as an interaction between institutional 
discourse and academic argument. Each of them also has shortcomings; either related to their 
focus or scope of analysis (regarding the actors who are participating, or the stages and 
modes of governance) or to their normative argumentation about the democratic added value 
of participation. By analysing the three debates together, this chapter allows for the 
identification of how each of them speaks to some shortcomings of the others. It also allows 
for the definition of several principles which should inspire any future attempt to reflect on 
EU institutional architectures that take participation seriously.  
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I argue that focusing on participation opens up opportunities to reflect on the 
democratic challenges and opportunities offered by the multiple types of actors active in EU 
governance in a way other democratic debates do not, such as those focused on the principle 
of accountability or architectures like federalism. At the same time, I argue that participation 
as such is not necessarily a democratic good. Direct citizens’ participation can be considered 
a democratic good, but for most participatory mechanisms the democratic yardstick lies in the 
principle of representation. Representation though should not simply be thought of in terms 
of interest representation but also in terms of knowledge-based claims-making.  
 
Participation versus representation 
 
The issue of participation appeared explicitly in EU official discourse during the 1990s. In 
1992 the Commission adopted two linked Communications, one on ‘An Open and Structured 
Dialogue between the Commission and Special Interest Groups’ (EC 1993a) and one on 
‘Increased Transparency in the Work of the Commission’ (EC 1993b), which had as 
objective increasing transparency of Commission work in order to facilitate the participation 
of interest groups in EU policy-making. However, it was only by the end of the 1990s that a 
discourse developed in which participation was presented as a key element for democratic 
governance, in particular by stressing the importance of civil society participation in 
European governance. This development has been sufficiently dealt with in the literature 
(Smismans 2003) and does not need detailed repetition here. In summary, we have witnessed 
a development from ‘civil dialogue’ as a way to include civil society organisations other than 
social partners (already profiting from a ‘social dialogue’) in social policy, to ad hoc sectoral 
references to the importance of civil society participation, to the general favouring of civil 
society participation in all policy areas as per the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on 
European Governance. This debate has been framed in terms of civil society participation 
providing democratic input which supplements that of the institutions of representative 
democracy. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), for instance, itself 
composed of civil society organisations, defined its own role as guaranteeing ‘the 
implementation of the participatory model of civil society, [enabling] civil society to 
participate in the decision-making process; and [helping] reduce a certain ‘democratic deficit’ 
and so [underpinning] the legitimacy of democratic decision-making processes’ as a 
complement to the legitimacy offered by the European Parliament (EESC 1999). Inspired by 
the Commission White Paper’s discourse on civil society, the Constitutional Treaty went as 
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far as constitutionalising both representative democracy and participatory democracy as part 
of the democratic foundations of the European Union. Although the Lisbon Treaty left out the 
concept of participatory democracy, the Constitutional Treaty article defining participatory 
democracy has been taken over entirely in what is now Article 11 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), following the definition of representative democracy in Article 10 TEU. The 
dual democratic input in the EU, based on representative democracy and additional 
participatory mechanisms, has thus been constitutionalised in the Treaties.  
However, during the European Convention debate leading to the Constitutional 
Treaty, the exact nature of participatory democracy was discussed. More precisely, some 
Convention members criticised the fact that the way participatory democracy was framed by 
the civil society debate had focused on the participation of intermediary actors and not of 
citizens directly (Smismans 2004: 133; Kohler-Koch 2011: 59). The final outcome of this 
debate led to Article 11 TEU including both elements of direct citizen participation and 
participation via intermediary organisations.  
The citizen is addressed by the requirement that ‘the institutions shall, by appropriate 
means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and 
publicly exchange their views on all areas of Union action’ (para. 1), which appears mainly to 
be a reference to participation in the public sphere. Most importantly, paragraph 4 introduces 
the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) as a new instrument of direct democracy, allowing at 
least one million citizens from at least seven Member States to invite the European 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, ‘to submit any appropriate proposal on 
matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaties’. Intermediary organisations are further addressed by the 
requirement for all EU institutions to ‘maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue 
with representative associations and civil society’ (para.2) as well as the obligation for the 
Commission to ‘carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that 
the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent’ (para.3). Hence, under the title ‘provisions 
on democratic principles’, and linked to the concept of European citizenship (Article 9 
TEU),1 the TEU has constitutionalised the dual democratic basis of EU governance, namely 
representative democracy, and participation (both direct and via intermediary organisations).  
This debate that centres around the participation/representation dichotomy, and which 
is the predominant way in which participation has been looked at in EU governance, has 
																																								 																				
1 On how this introduces a more participatory dimension to the concept of European citizenship, see 
Smismans (2009). 
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several shortcomings. The shortcomings are related to both the scope of the debate (and 
consequently the institutional arrangements proposed for participation) and the ambiguous 
way in which the added value of participation has been conceptualised. 
 
Limits in the scope of the debate 
 
The civil society debate and the constitutionalising debate about participatory versus 
representative democracy have focused on participation at the initial stage of policy-making, 
and the legislative stage in particular. As a consequence, the institutional mechanisms 
proposed to strengthen participation are also focused on this stage of policy-making. This 
applies to both initiatives that aim at participation through interest intermediation and at 
direct citizen participation.  
Initially, the civil society and participatory discourse led mainly to some Commission 
DGs organising broad forums, e.g. on an annual basis, inviting a wide range of civil society 
organisations to provide input on relatively broad agenda items. The main outcome of the 
civil society debate, however, is the Commission’s Communication on General Principles 
and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission (EC 
2002a), adopted in 2002, following promises made in the White Paper on European 
Governance (EC 2001), and slightly amended in 2012 after a public consultation (EC 2012).2 
While the principles and standards of consultation are applicable to all Commission 
Directorates-General (DGs), the title of the Communication is deceiving as it does not 
provide a general framework for Commission interaction with ‘interested parties’. It excludes 
explicitly from its scope, among others, comitology—i.e. the implementation of legislation 
by regulatory action adopted in interaction between the Commission and comitology 
committees composed of representatives from national administrations—and more generally 
all consultation mechanisms set out in the Treaties or ‘in other Community legislation’. 
Instead, the Communication focuses on ‘applying the general principles and minimum 
standards to those initiatives that will be subject to an extended impact assessment’ and on 
Green and White Papers. In fact, the main outcome of the Communication (and of the White 
Paper) is the increased use of open online consultations at the initial stage of new legislative 
initiatives (for which impact assessments are required). Hence, instead of providing a 
framework for the multiple ways in which interest groups participate at different stages of EU 
																																								 																				
2 The changes are minimal, leaving the original Communication as main reference document, with 
only some minor amendments provided by this Working Document.  
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policy-making, not least via a myriad of advisory committees, the Communication focused on 
increasing the participatory dimension of European governance by creating an additional way 
of participation at the initial stage of policy-making. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
provide a detailed empirical assessment of the extent to which such online consultations 
change participation and its influence in EU governance. Suffice it to note that online 
consultations are not a general practice for new policy proposals, with a diversity in practices 
among DGs (Quittkat 2013), and most Impact Assessments (IA) relying on targeted rather 
than general open online consultations (Bozzini and Smismans, forthcoming). Although most 
of the time open online consultations ensure a plurality of actor participation (Kohler-Koch 
2013:117), comments about the limited added value of, in particular, late consultations have 
been made (Quittkat 2013: 99). At the same time, in terms of representativity, there are clear 
imbalances among the national backgrounds of participants and it has been argued that the 
lack of resources of NGOs has led to the online consultations replicating the predominance of 
industry in EU interest representation channels (Quittkat 2013: 106).  
Central to the argumentation of this chapter is that the debate on civil society and 
participatory democracy has not changed the nature of participation in the underworld of 
advisory committees that constitute the heart of interest group participation in European 
informal governance. Moreover, its impact appears limited to the initial stage of new 
legislation, leaving, among others, delegated legislation and comitology untouched.3 This is 
in sharp contrast with, for instance, the US, where participation in delegated legislation is 
highly regulated, (Smismans 2005 and forthcoming b). This is not a plea to copy the 
American model of dealing with interest group participation, but it confirms the picture of the 
EU’s debate on civil society and participatory democracy as only dealing with part of the 
reality of interest group participation in European governance.  
In relation to the instruments for direct citizen participation, the focus has been 
equally restrictive, with the consequence that the instruments which have been created are 
likely to contribute at best very modestly to the legitimacy of EU governance, and at worst 
may even undermine it. The two key new opportunities for direct participation that result 
from this debate are the European Citizens’ Initiative  and the increased use of open online 
consultations by the Commission, which also allows individual citizens and not only interest 
groups to participate. The ECI has the democratic added value of encouraging debate in the 
public sphere on EU issues. At the same time, its agenda-setting power is limited and likely 
																																								 																				
3 On the weakly regulated framework of interest representation in comitology, see Smismans 2005. 
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to frustrate citizens in a way that may undermine EU legitimacy as it creates high 
expectations with those signing up to an initiative. However, unlike nation states, the EU has 
only attributed powers, and the ECI cannot assign new EU powers. Moreover, to the extent 
an initiative falls within EU powers, the Commission is limited in what it can do in relation to 
a regulatory framework already carefully crafted in a difficult balancing act between Member 
States and the EU co-legislators (EP and Council). This is particularly so for high profile 
political issues, which are exactly those that are most likely to attract enough signatures for a 
CI.  
The practice of the ECI until now is telling in this regard: of the 15 initiatives 
recorded and dealt with by the end of June 2014 (while 11 other are still pending),4 only two 
reached the requirements to incite a response by the Commission. While some initiatives are 
tiny in scope (such as the proposal for an additional but minor funding stream under 
Erasmus) most initiatives deal with high profile or at least very political topics, such as 
ensuring media pluralism, allowing EU citizens to vote in national parliamentary elections in 
their country of residence, or ensuring dairy cow welfare. The two initiatives that did gather 
the required number of signatures equally deal with highly political topics, namely one 
requiring EU legislation to implement the human right to water and sanitation (including the 
request that water supply and management of water resources should not be subject to 
internal market rules and that water services are excluded from liberalisation) and one asking 
the EU to establish a ban on, and end the financing of, activities which presuppose the 
destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and 
public health (the ‘One of us’ initiative). In particular the latter shows the sort of hot potatoes 
that may be thrown on the plate of the Commission.  
The Commission answered to the One of Us initiative by arguing that no new EU 
action would be taken in reply to the initiative (EC 2014b: 11). Its justification to take no 
action was based on references to the democratic majorities’ position on the issue in most of 
the Member States, the legislative majority for the EU regulatory framework and policy 
(expressed in both EP and Council), wider civil society consultations that had taken place on 
that regulatory framework, as well as the existing ethical governance mechanisms and 
scrutiny in place in research policy.. It is questionable whether one million signatures from 
seven Member States can counter that. Yet, the ECI creates the expectation that citizens 
would be able to ask the European legislator to take initiative or at least propose the European 
																																								 																				
4 The European Citizens’ Initiative Official Register, available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/welcome (last accessed 7 July 2014). 
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legislator to reconsider. Although the Commission is part of the European legislator (together 
with EP and Council), the justification for non action given by a non-elected body (the 
Commission) in reply to an ECI is unlikely to make the EU any more popular. The problem 
though is more fundamentally one of a tension between direct democracy and representative 
democracy.  
This is also illustrated by the other ECI that acquired sufficient signatures. Unlike the 
topic of the ‘One of us’ initiative, the topic of the fundamental right of water and sanitation is 
unlikely to meet profound ideological opposition. Yet, the petitioners’ request for the EU to 
take legislative action to ensure this fundamental right met again with a lukewarm response 
by the Commission (EC 2014a). The Commission falls short of promising new (legislative 
action) and mainly justifies what the EU already does to ensure this right, promising only 
further implementation of its policy and organising and EU wide consultation.  
The practice of the ECI so far suggests that all those who expected that this new 
instrument would allow the EU to take bold and very visible action upon the suggestions of 
its citizens are likely to be frustrated. It is difficult to identify topics on which the EU has 
competence but has not already acted within a regulatory framework that is the outcome of a 
very balanced exercise relying on national majorities, EU level representative institutions, 
and even wider society consultation and a scientific status quo. Hence, it is more likely that 
the ECI will lead at best to some technical tweaking or a gradual readjustment of a regulatory 
framework, in a way, though, that is unlikely to deliver the big legitimacy boost to European 
governance that some had hoped for.  
The other instrument that has (also) aimed at direct citizen participation is equally 
faced with strong limitations regarding its potential impact. Data show that online 
consultations on new legislative proposals or on new broad agenda setting communications 
via Green and White Papers attract mainly responses from interest groups rather than from 
individuals (Quittkat 2013: 101). Moreover, following the Commission’s General Principles 
and Standards of Consultation, the Commission officials are also advised to take into account 
the representativeness of participants in online consultations. While it is not entirely out of 
the question that an individual with expertise might have some influence on the drafting of 
new policy initiatives through online consultation, it is difficult to herald the online 
consultation process as an excellent example of participatory democracy in terms of direct 
citizen participation. As the online consultations appear to be dominated by interest groups, 
one may wonder whether alternative strategies of direct citizen participation, such as 
deliberative polls, would be more effective both in terms of ensuring more influence (as they 
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may be likely to be taken into account because they are considered more representative of 
civil society) and in terms of facilitating debate and the so called advantages of participation 
as a ‘school of democracy’. Moreover, focusing on online consultations at the initial stage of 
mainly legislative initiatives, the EU debate on participatory democracy has ignored direct 
citizen participation in other stages of policy-making and through more bottom-up and 
decentralised modes of governance. 
 
Limits in conceptualising the democratic added value of participation 
 
The limits in the scope of the debate on civil society and participatory democracy go hand in 
hand with the ambiguous way in which the democratic added value of participation has been 
defined. Political theory has mostly linked the concept of ‘participatory democracy’ to ideas 
of ‘direct democracy’, although the two are not synonymous. ‘Direct democracy’ has mainly 
referred to the referendum model and the classical city-state democracy of Ancient Greece. 
‘Participatory democracy’ emerged as a concept to revive the idea of direct participation in 
the complex society of the second half of the XX century (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984). It 
extended the idea of direct participation from the political world to other sectors of social life, 
such as the workplace, education and local public administration, and gave particular 
attention to ‘self-realisation’ and to deliberation in face-to-face relations, so stressing mostly 
a ‘small-group’ model of democracy (Sartori 1987: 112). Both direct and participatory 
democracy share the focus on democratic mechanisms in which individuals participate 
personally in the deliberations which concern them, in which there is no representation by 
intermediary bodies between those who make the decisions and those affected by them.  
However, the conceptual use of ‘participatory democracy’ in EU official discourses is 
more ambiguous. The ECI comes the closest to the direct participatory ideal, clearly based on 
the referendum idea, although it fails to work as a real referendum, because its threshold (one 
million citizens from at least seven member states) is too low to trigger action by the EU 
legislator. At the same time, making the ECI binding would suit badly for a polity which has 
no single demos and democratic balance is consociational rather than majoritarian in nature. 
Beyond the topic of the CI, the added value of direct citizen participation in EU 
governance has hardly been conceptualised in the EU’s debate on participation. The precise 
added value of online consultations (on main policy initiatives) in which citizens can also 
participate as individuals remains unclear. Such participation does not allow any of the face-
to-face deliberation and self-realisation heralded by theories of participatory democracy. 
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Neither does it offer any representative value in a way that e.g. deliberative polls and fora 
could offer. Hence, as its democratic added value is unclear, it is unlikely that EU decision-
makers would take into account opinions raised through such online consultations, unless it 
was on the basis of the expertise they provided. 
The major challenge, though, in conceptualising the added value of participation in 
the EU’s debate on civil society and participatory democracy relates to the fact that the main 
focus of this debate has been on interest group participation rather than on direct citizen 
participation. Yet, unlike for direct citizen participation, there is no intrinsic democratic 
added value to participation by intermediaries. Such participation may simply constitute 
policy-making captured by narrow interests. However, EU official discourse over the last 
decade is filled with references that herald participation as intrinsically good: the more 
participation the better. Many of the statements that suggest ‘the more participation the 
better’ are built on the assumption that participation mechanisms ensure a pluralist system of 
interest intermediation. Yet, the yardstick to assess the democratic added value of such 
participatory mechanisms is representation, and this is so in two ways.  
System representativeness refers to the extent to which the overall system of interest 
intermediation is representative of the interests concerned, while organisational 
representativeness refers to the way an intermediary organisation can claim to be 
representative of the interests it speaks for (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán and Smismans 2012). 
It is only more recently that the academic debate has looked at representation to assess the 
democratic added value of civil society participation (Jentgens 2012, Johansson 2012, 
Rodekamp 2012). The EU institutions themselves have only marginally dealt with the 
question of representation in the debate on civil society and participatory democracy. The 
EESC has attempted to come up with some criteria to define representativeness of civil 
society organisations, but has failed to define a realistic scope of application (Pérez-
Solórzano Borragán and Smismans 2012). At the same time, the Commission’s White Paper 
on European Governance proposed that civil society organisations would be granted 
‘privileged partnership arrangements’ depending on their representative character, but it 
failed both to define representativeness criteria and to develop such partnership arrangements.  
Soon after the White Paper the discourse changed from civil society organisations, 
which were said to have some particular representative character, to consultation with 
‘interested parties’, which was the focus in the 2002 Communication on Principles and 
Standards of Consultation. The change was clearly exemplified by the European 
Transparency Initiative: rather than ensuring the representative character of interest 
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intermediation, the focus shifted to ensuring transparency of interest group participation. This 
shift presents interest group participation as a democratic good as long as the process is 
transparent. However, while transparency is a necessary condition for democracy it is, as 
such, no guarantee for equal participation.  
Finally, in addition to the limits in scope of the debate on civil society and 
participatory democracy, and in the way the democratic added value of participation has been 
conceptualised, this debate has another shortcoming. Much in line with the predominant 
focus of democratic theory, this debate has looked at participation in terms of interest 
intermediation. The actors involved, whether interest groups or citizens directly, participate to 
defend their interest. However, insights from policy analysis and from science and 
technology studies have made clear that policy making is as much about knowledge-based 
claim-making as about interest-based claim-making. The question of how to organise 
participation in modern democratic governance can only be properly addressed by taking into 
account the relationships between these two. These relationships have in fact been discussed 
in (academic and official) debates about EU governance, but independently from the debate 
on civil society and participatory democracy. One such debate has focused on a dichotomy 
between participation and expertise, which will be discussed in the following section, while 
another debate has looked at the importance of participation in policy learning, which will be 
analysed in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Participation versus expertise 
There is a second debate on participation in European governance which has developed rather 
independently (both institutionally and academically) from the one described above. Contrary 
to the civil society and constitutional participatory democracy debate, which focuses on the 
dichotomy of participation versus representation, this second debate is focused on the 
dichotomy of participation versus expertise. It emerged from a concern on how to regulate to 
use of (scientific) expertise and sound evidence in European (risk) regulation and European 
governance more broadly, and subsequently addressed the question of participation in this 
context.  
Expertise has always been central to the European integration process. The functional 
approach to European integration considered the participation of actors with particular 
expertise in the areas of sectoral integration more important than wider public participation, 
with the initial parliamentary assembly not being directly elected and only having advisory 
power. However, as a topic of both institutional and academic debate, expertise only really 
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emerged during the 1990s. Particularly following the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE)-crisis, the EU’s regulatory framework was strongly contested for not respecting 
scientific standards and being biased by the interests of member states. In fact, the 
comitology system is based on a collaboration between the Commission and comitology 
committees which are composed of representatives from the national administrations. In the 
case of the ‘mad cow crisis’, the UK had managed through comitology to keep the European 
market open to its beef, which would not have been the case if decision-making had relied 
more heavily on the available scientific evidence.  
Both the institutional and the academic debates that followed have focused on the 
importance of ‘independent expertise’, which was assumed to be found in the creation of 
independent agencies. However, the European agencies, which multiplied from the 1990s 
onwards, have not taken the form of independent regulatory agencies. They have no 
regulatory powers but act mainly as information agencies, either giving advice to the 
European Commission and comitology, or as a network of exchange of information aimed at 
improving implementation at a national level. Nevertheless, insofar as European agencies 
have a role in European regulation, their creation is based on a distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management, which replicates the dichotomy between participation and 
expertise. Agencies are supposed to provide ‘neutral’ risk assessment, while it is up to the 
Commission and comitology procedures to ensure risk management and to take the political 
decisions. From this perspective, ‘participation’ should not be institutionalised via the 
agencies, which are supposed to gather ‘neutral’ scientific advice (although some agencies 
have some stakeholders on their board). It is up to the European Commission to organise 
wider participation by stakeholders and consultation; and it is up to the discretion of the 
Commission, and subsequently the EP and the Council (for legislation), or comitology 
committees (for comitology), to decide to what extent ‘neutral’ information gathered through 
agencies and interest-based arguments gathered through Commission consultation procedures 
are taken into account in the final political decision. 
During the first decade of the XXI century, the debate on expertise in EU policy-
making has shifted from the focus on agencies during the 1990s, to a debate on sound 
evidence in the context of the Better Regulation agenda, and the use ofimpact assessments 
more particularly. The debate on the European agencies, which function mainly as networks 
of national administrations rather than independent regulatory agencies, has now been framed 
in terms of the development of an ‘EU’s executive order’, ‘European administrative space’, 
or ‘European regulatory space’ (Thatcher and Coen 2009), rather than in terms of their 
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centrality in providing independent expertise for European regulatory action. At the same 
time, with the Better Regulation debate, the attention for expertise has turned to EU 
legislative action, whereas it was previously focused on delegated legislation, with the 
critique on comitology, and then on the implementation stage as it became centred around the 
role of the European agencies.  
Also, in relation to European legislative action, the debate has to a great extent been 
framed in terms of a dichotomy between participation and expertise. Following the White 
Paper on European Governance (EC 2001), the Commission adopted two separate 
communications, one on General Principles and Standards of Consultation by the European 
Commission (EC 2002a), and one on the Collection and Use ofExpertise by the Commission 
(EC 2002b). Although the latter recognises that ‘expertise can result both from scientific 
knowledge and from practical experience’ and that ‘sometimes experts and representatives of 
interested parties are brought together in single groups’, or even that ‘complementary 
expertise may be gathered during open consultations such as the publication of green and 
white papers’ (EC 2002b: 6), the general approach is that when one Communication is 
applicable the other is not. ‘The Commission’s minimum standards on public consultation 
apply in consultations of the public at large, and also when the Commission seeks the views 
of civil society groups and other interested parties because of the constituencies they 
represent, rather than because of the expertise they possess’ (EC 2002b: 7). Unlike 
consultation of stakeholders, the key principle of the expertise communication is that 
expertise is independent: ‘It is a truism that no one is entirely ‘independent’: individuals can 
never entirely set aside all thoughts of their personal background—family, culture, employer, 
sponsor, etc. Nevertheless, as far as possible, experts should be expected to act in an 
independent manner’ (EC 2002b: 8).  
The opposition between independent expertise and stakeholder participation is also 
present in the European Commission’s use of impact assessments. Compared to other 
countries and international organisations, the EU’s system of impact assessments pays more 
attention to ensuring participation of stakeholders during the drafting of impact assessments. 
Nevertheless, the EU system is also built on a distinction between ensuring ‘expertise’ on the 
one hand, and stakeholder evidence on the other hand.  
The 2009 Commission guidelines on impact assessments distinguish between 
‘internal expertise’ (ensured by creating a Steering Group with Officials from different DGs), 
and ‘external expertise’, for which it is said that ‘expert groups and, in particular, scientific 
committees set up by the Commission and EU Agencies are a prime source of scientific 
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advice’, while experts on the Commission expert website SINAPSE can also be used (EC 
2009: 18). Paying attention to the ‘consultation with interested parties’ is a separate objective 
that is not listed as internal of external expertise. It is said to be ‘an essential tool for 
producing high quality and credible policy proposals. Consultation helps to ensure that 
policies are effective and efficient, and it increases the legitimacy of EU action from the point 
of view of stakeholders and citizens’ (EC 2009: 19) While it is acknowledged that 
stakeholders or ‘interested parties’ can provide evidence, and can contribute to e.g. ‘finding 
new ideas (brainstorming), collecting factual data, and validating a hypothesis’ (EC 2009: 19) 
their involvement also comes with the warning that ‘it is important to distinguish evidence 
from opinions’ (EC 2009: 20). Stakeholders are expected to provide non-objective interest-
based information, and it is therefore said that DGs should ensure ‘peer-reviewing, 
benchmarking with other studies and sensitivity analysis’ in order to ‘significantly enhance 
the quality of data’ and ensure ‘the robustness of the results’ (EC 2009: 20). At the same 
time, DGs should be sure to ‘engage all affected stakeholders’ and ‘consult all relevant target 
groups’. Such wide involvement seems to have a representative dimension; it is only through 
wide participation of all stakeholders that the feasibility and legitimacy of policy proposals is 
ensured. Only wide stakeholder involvement ensures input-legitimacy. At the same time there 
seems to be an assumption that the category of external experts, namely expert committees, 
agencies and individual experts, ensure the gathering of ‘neutral expertise’, for which neither 
a cautious nor representative approach is required. 
One can conclude that the debate on expertise in EU policy-making answers some of 
the shortcomings of the civil society and participatory democracy debate by taking into 
account the relationship between participation and knowledge in policy-making, and not just 
in terms of its importance for interest representation. At the same time, this debate also has 
some shortcomings. 
In terms of the scope of the debate regarding stages and modes of governance, this 
debate has the advantage of dealing with both legislative action (impact assessment debate), 
and delegated legislation and implementation (comitology and agency debate). At the same 
time, the scope of the debate regarding the instruments for participation has been very 
limited. In the agency debate the focus has been on ensuring the independence of agencies, 
acknowledging that it is for the Commission to organise participatory procedures but without 
making clear proposals for the latter. In the debate on impact assessments, the importance of 
participation has been stressed; however, when it comes to proposing how to organise such 
participation, reference is made to the 2002 Principles and Standards of Consultation. Hence, 
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in terms of proposing institutional mechanisms for participation, the debate ends up pretty 
much the same as the debate ‘participation versus representation’ analysed above, i.e. relying 
on an increased use of online consultations on legislative and major policy initiatives without 
giving clear indications on how to organise participation at other stages of policy-making.  
This lack of imagination about the institutional design for participation goes together 
with the limited reflection on the precise democratic added value of participation in modern 
governance that is also dependent on knowledge and sound evidence. Firstly, in this debate 
on expertise in EU governance, direct citizen participation has remained out of the picture. 
Arguments about the importance of participation have focused on including stakeholders or 
have been framed in vague terms not distinguishing between participation by intermediaries 
and direct citizen participation. Secondly, the insistent focus on the dichotomy between 
expertise and participation fails to acknowledge the many insights from science and 
technology studies , sociology of science and policy analysis that such a strict distinction 
does not stand the test of reality (Maasen and Weingaert 2009; Jasanoff 2005). Interest-based 
participants also possess knowledge and evidence and definitely make knowledge-based 
claims. There has also been an increased ‘politicisation of science’ as opposed interest groups 
make claims on the basis of contradictory scientific arguments using only those supporting 
their position (Maasen and Weingaert 2009:4; Everson and Vos 2009: 8). In turn, this 
development makes public that science does not provide the single truth.  
As a consequence, the neutrality of science and expertise cannot be assumed, and 
there is plenty of evidence that science can be bent by special interests (MacGarity and 
Wagner 2010). The debate on the democratization of science has therefore proposed 
participatory mechanisms in the design and funding of research and development policies. 
This debate has been reflected in the EU’s research policy, with specific funding programmes 
‘Science and Society’ in FP6, and ‘Science in Society’ in FP7, and the principle of 
Responsible Research Innovation (RRI) becoming a horizontal principle for the entire 
Horizon 2020 research programme. ‘RRI is an inclusive approach to research and innovation, 
to ensure that societal actors work together during the whole research and innovation process’ 
and ‘to better align both the process and outcomes of R&I, with the values, needs and 
expectations of European society’.5 The challenge, though, goes beyond research policy. If 
we acknowledge that science does not provide the single truth, and the neutrality of expertise 
																																								 																				
5 HORIZON 2020 website, “Science with and for Society”, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/science-and-society (last accessed 7 
July 2014). 
16	
	
cannot be realized, it is not sufficient to organize participatory mechanisms in research 
(funding) policy. Instead, we need to address participation in relation to the use of expertise 
in all policy-making areas. 
 
Participation in reflexive governance 
 
There is a third debate on participation in European governance, which appears to reply to 
many of the shortcomings of the two other debates. It does not limit the focus of analysis to a 
particular stage of regulatory decision-making but looks at participation in different modes of 
governance and throughout the entire policy-cycle. Moreover, this debate seems to overcome 
the rigid opposition between participation and expertise as it is framed in terms of learning, in 
which participation has a central place. It acknowledges that decision-making is about both 
interest representation and knowledge gathering, with participation playing a role in both and 
not limited to the first.  
This debate has developed academically around arguments of reflexive governance 
and directly deliberative polyarchy (DDP).6 Reflexive governance has been discussed in both 
policy analysis, particularly in environmental policy, and legal theory, particularly based on 
Gunther Teubner’s autopoietic theory of reflexive law (Eriksen 2005; Vos, Bauknecht and 
Kemp 2006; De Schutter and Lenoble 2010). The common ground is the focus on policy and 
law-making as a cyclical and permanent learning process in which experience with the policy 
or law in practice leads to amendment of that policy or norm (first order learning) and in 
which the process of policy- and law-making itself can be revised (second order learning) 
(Vos, Bauknecht and Kemp 2006). Most authors on reflexive law and governance stress the 
importance of a wide decentralised participation in these learning processes. At the same 
time, theories on reflexive governance or law are often proposed as analytical, describing the 
changing nature of modern policy and law making. When they are more normative, it is 
mainly in proposing the conditions under which learning would best occur. Arguments about 
the democratic nature of reflexive governance are often made implicitly rather than explicitly.  
The model of DDP is, instead, explicitly proposed as a design for modern democratic 
governance. DDP is a democratic ideal that is based on the idea that ‘local-, or more exactly, 
lower-level actors (nation state or national peak organizations of various kinds; regions, 
provinces or sub-national associations within these, and so on down to the level of whatever 
																																								 																				
6 The authors of DDP have equally used the term ‘democratic experimentalism’ for their model. 
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kind of neighbourhood the problem in question makes relevant) are granted autonomy to 
experiment with solutions of their own devising within broadly defined areas of public 
policy. In return they furnish central or higher-level units with rich information regarding 
their goals as well as the progress they are making towards achieving them, and agree to 
respect in their actions framework rights of democratic procedure’. (Gerstenberg and Sabel 
2002: 291). The system is ‘directly-deliberative’ since ‘citizens must examine their own 
choices in the light of the relevant deliberations and experiences of others’ (Cohen and Sabel 
1997:314)—in contrast to other discursive ideas of democracy of deliberation by an 
administrative or political elite. The system is ‘polyarchic’ due to the permanent 
disequilibrium created by the grant of substantial powers of initiative to lower-level units 
(Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002:292). The democratic claims of DDP are akin to ideas of 
participatory democracy (Pateman 1970) and deliberative democracy in that it focuses on 
direct participation and deliberation in terms of rational argument. DDP aims at 
decentralization ‘down to the level of whatever kind of neighbourhood the problem in 
question makes relevant’ (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002: 291), and postulates ‘direct 
participation by and reason-giving between and among free and equal citizens’ (Cohen and 
Sabel 1999: 1) as a normative ideal. ‘There is a presumption in favour of equal membership 
for affected parties – open meetings, with equal rights to participate in discussion and 
decision-making for all affected parties’ (Cohen and Sabel 1999: 15).  
However, the debate on participation in reflexive governance is not merely a 
theoretical one. The EU institutions too have developed discourses on the importance of 
participation in reflexive governance and have set up institutional mechanisms for this. Two 
institutional designs in particular rely on this approach, namely the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) and, more recently, the European Commission’s attempts to develop an 
‘evaluation culture’ throughout the entire policy-cycle.  
The OMC has been widely discussed in the literature and does not need a detailed 
description here. Kröger 2009). Instead of relying on binding EU intervention, the OMC is 
based on the definition of European guidelines, for which the Member States then have to set 
out national action plans explaining how they intend to and have realised these guidelines. 
These action plans are subsequently assessed at the European level (which may lead to 
revision of the guidelines) and may be combined with a process of specific recommendations 
addressed to the Member States. This cyclical process is combined with the definition of 
benchmarks and measurable indicators allowing comparison of best practice. Moreover, the 
OMC is said to be based on a ‘fully decentralised approach’, in line with the principle of 
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subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as 
the social partners and civil society, are actively involved, using variable forms of partnership 
(European Council 2000). 
The OMC has been described by the authors of DDP as an example of their model. 
However, empirical analysis of the OMC in different fields has shown that, although civil 
society participation is to a certain extent ensured in some OMCs, it is mainly national 
administrators and experts who participate in this mode of governance (Jacobsson and Vifell 
2005; Léonard, Erne, Marginson and Smismans 2007: 70). The OMC guarantees direct 
citizen participation to an even lesser extent. The OMC can be described as a process of 
experience-driven revising of framework provisions as suggested by the authors of DDP 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), but there appears to be very little in this mode of governance that 
would bring it anywhere close to the direct participatory dimension the normative claims of 
DDP are focused on.  
One can argue that there will always be a gap between normative models and 
empirical reality. However, when the gap is wide and intrinsically impossible to be bridged it 
undermines the usefulness of the normative model as guidance for modern governance. I 
have argued elsewhere (Smismans 2010) that there is an intrinsic shortcoming in DDP which 
undermines its usefulness as a normative guide for European governance. Unlike theories of 
reflexive law, DDP underestimates the systemic nature of knowledge and society. As argued 
in systems theory, society is constituted of subsystems with their own language, making 
interaction between these subsystems not entirely impossible but very difficult. Gerstenberg 
and Sabel argue instead that ‘local knowledge is neither tacit nor fully and self-referentially 
systematic. Co-ordination among local collaborators is necessary because of the diversity of 
their views and possible because . . . the exploration of the ambiguities internal to each 
shades into exchange with the others. But as local co-ordination yields new ambiguities of its 
own, there is both need and possibility for inter-local exchange through a new centre that 
frames discussion and re-frames it as results permit.’(Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002: 340). 
However, the evidence of governance practices, in particular in the context of the EU, shows 
that the heterogeneity of participants (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 333) within local units emerges 
far less spontaneously than DDP seems to suggest given the systemic expertise that is 
required. Moreover, a new centre at a higher level that allows inter-local exchange may 
indeed provide opportunity to reframe discussion, but the (partial) self-referentiality of 
subsystems implies that, if not consciously institutionalised, there will be a tendency for such 
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a higher level centre to be created within the subsystem rather than creating deliberation 
across subsystems.  
As the OMC illustrates, European governance tends to occur through auto-referential 
deliberation between functional actors structured by the language of each subsystem, rather 
than as a bottom-up process based on citizen participation and a rather spontaneous process 
of cross-system interaction. I have therefore argued that ‘reflexivity’ should also be used as a 
normative device to encourage the conscious crafting of institutional mechanisms that allow 
for cross-system interaction (Smismans 2010). However, while such reflexivity can be 
welcomed from a democratic perspective as it encourages deliberation towards the general 
interest rather than decision-making inspired by the rationale of one subsystem of functional 
actors, it does not answer the problem that such reflexive governance does not involve the 
citizens directly. Hence, one needs, on the one hand, to address the question of the 
representative nature of the functional actors involved in these processes (as discussed above) 
and, on the other hand, to identify how such modes of governance relate to institutions of 
representative democracy. Paul Magnette (2006) has rightly criticised DDP for not 
acknowledging the potential of representative democracy—as opposed to direct participatory 
processes of DDP—in fostering civic equality and civic education.7 In relation to the OMC, 
many have therefore stressed the role national parliaments should play in this procedure, e.g. 
in the discussion of national action plans, while others have equally pointed to the added 
value of benchmarking procedures of the OMC in providing information and comparative 
evidence for strengthening political debate in representative democracy (De Schutter 2010; 
De Ruiter 2011). At the same time, these suggestions do not entirely overcome the weakness 
of participation (directly or via the institutions of representative democracy) in the drafting of 
guidelines at the EU level, which set out the normative framework in a rather technocratic or 
politically weakly participatory way by the Commission and the Council. 
The second European institutional debate on participation in reflexive governance is 
far more recent than the OMC and still hardly discussed academically,8 namely the European 
Commission’s attempt to develop an ‘evaluation culture’ throughout the entire policy-cycle. 
In 2010 the Commission proposed to turn its ‘Better Regulation’ agenda into a ‘Smart 
Regulation’ agenda (EC 2010). A key feature of this ‘smart regulation’ is to establish a real 
																																								 																				
7 Magnette (2006). In a comparable way, Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (2005: 65, 72) criticizes DDP for 
underestimating the normative force of the claim of a demos and the idea of an encompassing general 
public of citizens, and therefore unable to account for how the principles of democratic equality and 
solidarity would be realised. 
8 For an exception see Luchetta (2012) and Smismans (2015).  
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evaluation culture throughout the entire policy-cycle. Concrete proposals in that sense were 
not made until 2013 with a Commission Communication on improving evaluation (EC 
2013a), followed by an online consultation process on a draft of new evaluation guidelines,9 
the outcome of which is under analysis by the Commission at the time of writing this chapter. 
Evaluation is not new to EU policy, but it has mainly focused on the ex post evaluation of EU 
expenditure programmes to ensure financial accountability and political control on the use of 
the EU budget (Hojlund 2015). With the Smart Regulation agenda, evaluation should become 
a process of learning throughout the policy cycle, and for all types of EU policy, whether 
expenditure policy or regulatory policy. Information and assessment about the impact of EU 
policies has to be gathered more systematically and has to feed back into the policy cycle. Ex 
ante impact assessments for new action should take into account feedback provided through 
ex post evaluation, as well as set out the options on how evaluation of such future action can 
be organised. The new draft guidelines on impact assessments (which not accidentally have 
been published for online consultation just when the Commission is finalising its new 
evaluation guidelines)10 equally reflect this philosophy of linking ex ante and ex post 
evaluation.  
The new ‘evaluation culture’ thus aims at reflexive governance for all types of EU 
intervention. Participation is said to play a central role in this. The draft evaluation guidelines 
state the following under the title ‘who contributes information to evaluation?’:  
Member States, stakeholders, academics, citizens and a wide range of other 
parties are involved by providing data and opinion about interventions and 
wider policies. By contributing to, reading and reacting to evaluation reports, 
they provide further direct input to the decision making system. They play an 
important part in testing findings and driving independent and impartial 
evaluations. (EC 2013b: 26) 
Although not explicitly stated in these terms, the evaluation guidelines thus envisage 
two ways in which participation processes contribute to the democratic decision-making 
conceived as a cyclical learning process. By referring to ‘reading and reacting to evaluation 
reports’ the guidelines envisage participation through interaction with the institutions of 
																																								 																				
9 European Commission, Consultation on the draft Commission Evaluation Policy Guidelines, 
launched on 12 November 13 and closed on 25 February 14. http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/evaluation/consultation/index_en.htm (accessed 15 July 2014). 
10 European Commission, Public consultation on the revision of the Commission's Impact Assessment 
guidelines, launched on 1 July 14 and to be closed on 30 September 14.  
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/consultation_2014/index_en.htm (accessed 15 July 2014). 
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representative democracy at the EU level. The guidelines therefore stress the importance of 
the transparency of evaluation reports (to be published on a central website, together with the 
evaluation mandate and a Commission response on how it will follow up on the evaluation) 
in order to facilitate democratic deliberation on it.  
The purpose of evaluations, namely to promote accountability/transparency 
and organisational learning, can only be achieved if the information produced 
by such evaluations reaches those to whom we are accountable to (general 
public, parliaments, etc.) or certain intermediaries (journalists) and those who 
should learn from the results. All evaluation reports of high quality should 
therefore be disseminated in a manner suited to the different audiences. Active 
discussion and debate on these findings should be encouraged. (EC 2013b: 43) 
Stakeholders and citizens could not only make use of this information via public 
debate that could link (via the political parties) to parliamentary debate, they could also use 
this information when participating in online consultations for new EU action. 
At the same time, participatory mechanisms have to play a role in the evaluation 
process itself. The draft guidelines provide a role both for stakeholders and individual citizens 
in this. Evaluation reports should be based on ‘a careful analysis of stakeholders' arguments 
and a double-checking against the arguments of other stakeholder groups and, where 
possible, against information from independent third parties or official statistics’ (EC 2013b: 
37). The latter is a warning against simply copying stakeholder positions. At the same time, it 
is said that ‘quantitative data should always be complemented with and double-checked 
against qualitative information from other sources (interviews, etc.). This means for instance 
that an evaluation should not just present an econometric model, its results and limitations, 
but should always seek to get further confirmation by asking stakeholders in how far and why 
the results make sense to them.’ (EC 2013b: 37). Hence, the draft guidelines recognize the 
double role of stakeholder participation in gathering policy evidence; not only do 
stakeholders provide information (even if biased), they also play a role in contextualizing and 
assessing information provided through expertise models, as the neutrality and societal face-
value of the latter cannot be taken for granted.  
Moreover, the draft guidelines state that participation should not be limited to 
organized stakeholder groups (at national or European level).  
To capture the "end-user perspective" in an evaluation, it needs to be carefully 
checked . . . whether it would be better to reach out directly to final 
beneficiaries or end-users (by interviewing a representative sample of 
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individuals - consumers, farmers, travellers, students, business owners, etc.) 
which we hoped would benefit from a policy or have had to bear its cost (EC 
2013b: 37). 
Compared to the other example of reflexive EU governance, namely the OMC, the 
debate on policy evaluation throughout the policy-cycle seems to provide at first sight an 
easier answer to the role of participation in democratic modern governance. 
Firstly, participatory mechanisms can be more easily presented as a complement to 
representative democracy, since the EU representative institutions, and the EP in particular, 
play a more prominent role in regulatory and expenditure policy than in the case of the OMC. 
At the same time, one may note that the democratic value remains so strongly based on 
representative democracy that it is unlikely that authors of DDP would consider the new 
evaluation culture as an example of their model as it is hardly polyarchic in the sense of 
granting substantial powers of initiative to lower levels. Secondly, compared to the OMC 
debate, the evaluation debate appears to pay some more attention to individual participation. 
Although the language of ‘end-user perspective’ does not fit naturally with participatory 
theories, it does not require too much imagination to frame the organization of ‘representative 
samples’ in terms of deliberative polls, etc. 
However, asking for imagination is indeed the weak point of the current debate as the 
proof of the pudding is in the eating. The challenge is twofold: how exactly will participation 
be organized, and how can it feed back into new EU action? Besides the vague reference to 
‘representative samples’, the draft guidelines mainly focus on transparency as a way to 
encourage participation; by way of each DG publishing a five-year evaluation plan (EC 
2013b: 17), assumingly to allow stakeholders to play some role in the evaluation process, and 
publication of the reports to encourage debate in interaction with the representative 
institutions which may feed back in new action. However, the main challenge in organizing 
participation in the new reflexive evaluation culture is in fact who is going to organize that 
participation. Traditionally ex post evaluations have been done by external consultancies, in 
particular to ensure independent financial accountability. However, such consultancies are ill-
suited to organize the wide participation on which learning is based. This relates to the 
second problem; namely how participation can feed back into new action. Insights from the 
policy-learning literature have made clear that learning is more likely to occur if the actors 
involved in new policy initiatives were also involved with assessment of prior initiatives 
(Hojlund 2015). For the moment, however, the EU system is based on ex post evaluations 
being mainly outsourced to consultancies, while the ex ante impact assessments are done by 
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the Commission, while ensuring consultation. From a learning perspective, it would be more 
efficient for the Commission also to take care of ex post evaluations, but this stands in 
contrast to the accountability objective that has until now inspired such evaluations. From the 
perspective of creating participatory reflexive governance, the question remains how to create 
a link between participation in the ex post evaluation that feeds back into a participatory 
process related to new initiatives. For now, the EU’s new evaluation culture raises more 
questions than answers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the three debates through which participation has been 
conceptualised in European governance. The most prominent debate, which developed 
mainly around the discourses on civil society and participatory democracy, has opposed 
participation to representation. It has been limited in scope in that it has focused on 
(instruments for) participation at the initial (particularly legislative) stage of policy-making. 
Moreover, the democratic added value of participation through interest groups and via the 
proposed mechanisms for direct participation, namely the Citizens’ Initiative and online 
consultations, has been poorly justified. Finally, the debate has ignored that participation in 
modern governance is as much about knowledge-based claims-making as it is about interest-
based claims-making.  
The second debate seems to have answered partially to the shortcomings of the first. 
Focused on the role of expertise in policy-making, it has covered both the legislative (impact 
assessments) and the implementation stage of policy-making (comitology and agencies). 
However, while apparently wider in scope in terms of stages of policy-making than the first 
debate, the proposed instruments for participation are pretty much the same as those in the 
first debate. This is partially the consequence of the way in which this debate has framed 
participation in opposition to expertise. As expertise is ‘externalised’ and independent, 
ensuring participation is a task of the Commission, which has simply relied on the 
instruments developed within the first debate, particularly a wider use of online consultation 
at the start of new (legislative) initiatives. Not only has this debate thus failed to imagine 
participatory instruments in other stages and modes of policy-making, it has also failed to 
recognise that participatory procedures may be needed to ‘democratise’ the expert basis of 
policy-making as the independence and neutrality of the latter cannot be taken for granted.  
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The third debate again seems to answer part of the shortcomings of the other two 
debates. Dealing with both the OMC (where the EU has only a coordinating role) and all 
centrally organised EU interventions (expenditure and regulatory policy to be subject to 
evaluation), the debate on participation in reflexive governance appears to cover all modes of 
governance and stages of policy-making. Moreover, wide participation is conceptualised as 
having a central role in a cyclical process of policy-making where both interest-based 
arguments and knowledge-based arguments lead to learning. However, the practice of both 
the OMC and the evaluation culture raises important questions about how participation (and 
in particular direct participation) can effectively be realised, as well as questions about the 
relationship between participatory and representative democracy.  
In the absence of a convincing normative democratic model that can realistically 
envisage a central role for participation in modern governance, the analysis of the three 
current debates allows at least the identification of some principles for any further reflection 
on future institutional architectures in which participation is key.  
Firstly, participation has to be conceptualised throughout the entire policy-cycle and 
not simply by creating some participatory mechanisms at the start of it. Secondly, most of the 
debate on participation is about the participation of interest groups rather than direct citizen 
participation. Such a debate is welcome to the effect that it encourages democratic reflections 
on the complexity of modern governance rather than limiting the debate to the traditional 
institutions of representative democracy. At the same time, such participation is not 
inherently good, and should be democratically assessed from the perspective of 
representation, both relating to system representativeness and organisational 
representativeness. Moreover, one should take into account that modern governance is as 
much about knowledge-based as about interest based claims-making. Democratic theory has 
focused on the latter. More recent reflections in democratic theory, such as Saward’s 
representative claims-making (Saward 2010), may be able to encompass both the place of 
knowledge and interests in democratic decision-making. Such a debate should acknowledge 
that knowledge and interests cannot be institutionalised in complete separation. Models based 
on a rigid dichotomy between participation and expertise are not only a fictitious reflection of 
reality but they also ignore the important role of participation in democratising expertise. At 
the same time, one cannot easily assume that bottom-up direct participation would lead to the 
automatic gathering of knowledge and definition of the general interest in a way DDP 
assumes. Expertise is often systemic and reflexivity should be used as a normative guide to 
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create an institutional framework that encourages ways for subsystems of functional actors to 
take each others’ deliberations into account (Smismans 2010).  
Thirdly, as participation is mainly about functional participation (to be assessed in 
terms of representation), one can wonder whether there is still an added value to the 
participatory principle. Citizens participate either in the electoral process or via direct 
instruments such as the ECI or online consultations. Magnette (2006) pointed to the 
importance of representative democracy in fostering civic equality and civic education, in a 
way many instruments of functional governance cannot. The same can be argued for direct 
participatory mechanisms, such as the ECI and online consultations, which provide equal 
access points for all, and allow for civic education (although the latter might be qualified in 
relation to online participation).  
The EU’s institutional design will thus be dependent on crafting a balance between 
representative, functional and direct democracy instruments. There is reason, though, to be 
modest in expectations in relation to direct participatory mechanisms. As the ECI shows they 
may well run into ‘no demos’ considerations, in a similar way to the representative 
democracy argument once one would intend to give them more force. Similarly, the lack of 
representativity of individual contributions to online consultations makes them unlikely to 
have an influence. Direct participatory instruments which take into account questions of 
representativity, such as deliberative polls, may therefore be more successful.  
Finally, I would like to finish by stressing how important it is that democracy ensures 
the right for each individual to express herself. Even Machiavelli, who is mainly known for 
his view on power that pushes realism to cynical levels, stressed that in a republic citizens 
should be able ‘to run wildly through the streets’ to avoid domination by the elite (Brown 
2009:42). In a contemporary interpretation, ‘running wildly through the streets’ can be 
ensured through the right to protest (also online) and the freedom of association. Such basic 
freedoms of citizen participation are no luxury when modern governance, dominated by 
functional representation and expertise, derails, as the financial crisis has illustrated. Neither 
can they be taken for granted, as recent limitations on them in, for instance, Hungary and 
Spain, in reaction to the financial crisis have shown. The EU, therefore, has been called upon, 
not only to ensure participation within EU decision-making, but also to play a more proactive 
role to ensure that such basic participatory rights are respected within its member states 
(Smismans, forthcoming a). 
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